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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DALE S. PIERRE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No.

LAWRENCE MORRIS, Warden,
Utah State Prison,
Defendant-Respondent.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case is an appeal from a decision of the
Honorable James S. Sawaya dismissing appellant's petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus based on appellant's previous
conviction for the crime of first degree murder and sentence
of death.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Respondent's motion to dismiss was granted on
appellant's petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus which was
:1led in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
~a~e

County, State of Utah, the Honorable James S. Sawaya,

~r~s1dino.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
~c··ell3nt

seeks to have the D1strict Court's order

1 ,~~ell3nt's
for byWrit
ofof Museum
Habeas
Corpus
Sponsored by ~~.
the S.J. Quinney
Law Library. Fundingpetition
for digitization provided
the Institute
and Library
Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

reversed and to have this court remand the case to the Third
Judicial District Court, and to require respondent to file
responsive pleadings, and to order the district court to
hold an evidentiary hearing and a hearing on the merits of
appellant's petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
STATEl4ENT OF FACTS
The appellant, Dale S. Pierre, was convicted of
three counts of first degree murder and two counts of
aggravated robbery and was sentenced to death.

On appeal

to the Supreme Court of Utah the conviction and sentence
were upheld in State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (1977).

A

petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court was denied without adjudication on the merits.

The

appellant was resentenced to be executed on Decenber 7, 1978.
On November 28, 1978, appellant filed a petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus in the Third District Court (R.2-142).
Appellant also moved the district court to order a stay
of execution (R.l43).

The appellant's petition raised

questions involving Article I, Sections 7, 9, 10, and 12
of the Constitution of Utah and the Sixth, Eighth, and
F~urteenth

(R.3-9).

Amendments to the United States Constitution
A hearing on the motion was set for November 29,

1978, before the Honorable James S. Sawaya.
respondent made a
st3ted

1n

the

~otion

~otion

to

to dism1ss
d~s~1ss

rR.l~~l

At that time
The

~rounds

~ere:
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1. Petitioner may not, by writ of
habeas corpus, raise issues that were or
could have been raised in his direct appeal
to the Utah Supreme Court, State v. Pierre,
572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977).
2. Prosecutorial discretion in
charging a capital felony is permissible
under recent rulings of the United States
Supreme Court.
3. All issues raised by petitioner
which were addressed in prior pleadings
were answered by the State of Utah either
in its brief to the Utah Supreme Court or
in its brief in opposition to petitioner's
petition for certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court and adequately disposed of
such issues on the merits.
(R.l44)
After hearing argument on the motions, Judge Sawaya
granted the respondent's motion to dismiss the petition and
denied the appellant's motion for stay of execution (R.l58).
The district court judge issued a memorandum decision in
which the reason for its rulings was given.
It is the opinion of the Court that
the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
filed herein raises no issue of fact or
law material to determination of the
legality and constitutionality of the
conviction, confinement or sentence of
the Petitioner which were raised on appeal
to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
(R.l50).
Later that afternoon a notice of appeal was filed
in the district court and Justice Maughan ordered a stay of
execution.

That order was overruled by this court by a

v0te of 4 to l and the question of the stay of execution
~as
0 '~

s~•

for hearino before the entire court on December 4,
~~·~r

hearina 3raument on the question of the stay
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of execution, this court ordered a stay of execution because
an appeal is pending before the court.
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY DISMISSED
THE APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS BECAUSE THE APPELLANT RAISED ISSUES
THAT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN RAISED ON DIRECT
APPEAL, THESE ISSUES INVOLVED FACTS NOT AVAILABLE AT THE TIME OF THE TRIAL AND ISSUES THAT
AROSE FROM THIS COURT'S OPINION IN THE DIRECT
APPEAL, AND ISSUES THAT AROSE FROM RECENTLY
DECIDED CASES BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT.

The sole reason that the trial court gave in its
memorandum decision for dismissing the appellant's petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus was that the appellant had failed
to raise any issue of law or fact that was not or could not
have been raised on appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.
statement is clearly erroneous for several reasons.

This
First

of all, a number of issues raised in appellant's petition
resulted from this court's decision in State v. Pierre,
572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977).

Secondly, other issues arose

as a result of opinions issued by the United States Supreme
Court in cases decided either while the Supreme Court of
Utah had the appellant's previous appeal under advisement
or after the opinion in State v. Pierre, supra, was issued.
Thirdly, the appellant and his co-defendant were the first
persons sentenced to death under the new statutory scheme
enacted in 1973.

S1nce that

t1~e.

factu3l cuestions about
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capital punishment have arisen.

Finally, the state of the

law with respect to capital punishment in the United States
is very technical and some issues simply were not apparent
until the law had been extensively studied by commentators
and counsel.
State v. Pierre, supra, is the first case to raise
the question of the constitutionality of capital punishment
in Utah after the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Gregg v. Georgia, 428

u.s.

153, reh. den., 429

u.s.

878 (1976).

The court's opinion in State v. Pierre, supra, like most
appellate decisions opened a number of new issues which to
date remain unanswered in Utah.

The appellant raised these

issues in his petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

The issues

resulting from the Court's opinion in State v. Pierre, supra,
include points 12(a)l, 2, 4, and 5 of appellant's petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus (R.5-7).

These points involve the

discretion that the sentencing authority has in imposing the
death penalty, the need for specification of the aggravating
circumstances which the sentencing authority found to exist,
the guidance given to the sentencing authority in reaching
the decision of whether or not to impose the death penalty,
and the nature and scope of appellate review in capital cases.
Issues with respect to the burden of proof to be applied at
~he

sentencino phase also arose out of the ruling in State

~l"'rre.,

c.,

'.'irt~

supr3,

1nd '"'ere raised by appellant in his petition

of Habeas Corpus in points 12(g),

(h), and (i)

(R.B) ·
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d

During the pendency of the appeal in the case of
State v. Pierre, supra, significant changes took place in the
United States in the law with respect to capital punishment.
After the appellant had submitted his original brief in State

v. Pierre, supra, the United States Supreme Court decided
the cases of Gregg v. Georgia, supra, Proffitt v. Florida,

428 U.S. 242 reh. den., 429

u.s.

875 (1976), Jurek v. Texas,

428 U.S. 262 reh. den., 429 U.S. 875 (1976),

u.s.

Roberts v. Louisiana, 428

Stanislaus

325 reh. den., 429

u.s.

890

(1976), and Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)
A short amended brief was submitted by the appellant that
dealt with these cases.

Cases that were decided after the

state had submitted its brief in State v. Pierre, supra,
included Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977), Harry
Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977), and Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).

None of these cases were

included in the briefs for either party in State v. Pierre,
supra, nor were they mentioned by this court in its opinion
in that case, finally, after the opinion by this court in
State v. Pierre, supra, was issued the United States Supreme
Court decided Lockett v. Ohio,
(1978),

and Bell v. Ohio,

u.s.

l'.

,

s.

, 57 L.Ed 2d 973

57 L .:Cd 2d 1010

(1978).

Specific issues raised 1n appellant's petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus arose out of these cases.
v . Flo r i d 3

,

sup r

3. ,

3

deoree murder and the

In "ardner

d. e ~end 2 r. ': ·.,·u.s :ct....: :1 d .:;- u i l t ~ · ::-: : i r s t
1ur~·

r~~cm~e~~ed

3

l:~e

se~~e~-e

but
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the judge ordered the death penalty on the basis of a confidential pre-sentence report.

The Supreme court held that

the refusal to disclose the contents of the report and grant
him the opportunity to explain or deny the statements constituted a denial of due process.

Points 12(a)2 and 3

(R.6) which deal with the pleading and notice of aggravating
circumstances arose from the Court's ruling in Gardner v.
Florida, supra.
In Coker v. Georgia, supra, the Supreme court held
that it is cruel and unusual to impose the sentence of death
for the crime of rape.

In doing so a majority of the court

agreed on a test and method of analysis for determining what
is cruel and unusual punishment with respect to the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.

This test and analysis opened the issue of the

constitutionality of the methods of imposing capital punishment in Utah which was raised in point 12 (d)

(R. 7) of

appellant's petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Under this

new test and analysis the issue of the method of the imposition
of the death penalty can now be raised even though the United
States Supreme court approved of these methods over one
hundred years ago in

~lilkerson

v. Utah, 99 U. 5. 130 (1878).

Finally, In Lockett v. Ohio, supra, and Bell v.
=!-,l~.

surra, the Supreme Court held that the Ohio ca;Jital

,,-,=h~~~t

statutes were unconstitutional because they

:_:-L'
-,-:_1-l'lt~ng c1rcumstances that a sentencing
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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authority could consider before deciding whether or not to
impose the death penalty.

However, Mr. Justice White in

his concurring opinion concluded that the statute was
unconstitutional because it allowed the imposition of the
death penalty without a finding that the defendant possessed
a purpose to cause the death of the victim.

Point 12(c)

(R.7) of appellant's petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
arose out of the concurring opinions expressed by Mr. Justice
White in Lockett v. Ohio, supra, and Bell v. Ohio, supra.
Several of the issues raised in the appellant's
petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus lacked a factual basis
that could have been developed at the time of trial.

These

issues relate to the pattern and practice of the prosecution
of capital felonies and administration of the death penalty.
Point 12(b) of appellant's petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
(R.7) raises the question of the pattern and practice of
prosecution of capital felonies.

Point 12(e)

(R.7-8) raises

the question of arbitrary and capricious administration of
the death penalty.

Point 12(f) raises the question of

arbitrary and discriminatory prosecution of capital cases.
Since the appellant and his co-defendant were some of the
first persons to be sentenced to death under the new statutory

scheme, the factual basis for full litigation of these question
was insufficient at the time
previous appeal was made.
such

~uestions

was net

o~

Thus,

av3~l3ble

trial
~~ll

~hen

and

co the

the record for the
~a1r

l:t1~at1on

3~cell~nt

of

at the t1me
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of trial.
As has just been shown, all of the issues raised
in the appellant's petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus arose
either from facts unavailable to appellant at the time of
his conviction or from cases that were neither briefed by
the parties nor mentioned in the court's opinion

in~

v. Pierre, supra, or from the opinion in that case itself.
Since this case involves the imposition of the death penalty
under state law, it should naturally follow that the state
courts be the first courts to decide these very important
issues.

This case must be remanded to the district court

so that a proper record may be made to enable this court to
rule upon these issues, which as has been shown, could not
have been raised on direct appeal to this court from the
conviction of first degree murder and sentence of death.
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POINT II
THE BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF REQUIRED
IN UTAH CAPITAL SENTENCING PROCEDURES VIOLATES
APPELLANT'S FOURTEENTH AND EIGHTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS BECAUSE THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS IMPERMISSIBLY SHIFTED TO THE DEFENDANT, THE
SENTENCING AUTHORITY IS ALLOWED TO EXERCISE
UNGUIDED DISCRETION IN IMPOSING A SENTENCE
OF DEATH, AND THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH
PENALTY IS MADE MANDATORY UPON A FINDING OF
GUILT UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES.

The appellant was convicted of murder in the first
degree pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202 (1973 as amended).~/
To be found guilty of this offense the State has to prove

1/
76-5-202. Murder in the first degree.--(1) Criminal
homicide constitutes murder ~n the first degree if the
actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another
under any of the following circumstances:
(a)
The homicide was committed by a prisoner who is
confined in a jail or other penal institution regardless of
whether such confinement is legal.
(b)
At the time the homicide was committed the actor
also committed another homicide.
(c) The actor knowingly created a great risk of death
to a person other than the victim and the actor.
(d)
The homicide was committed while the actor was
engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or
flight after committing or attempting to commit, aggravated
robbery, robbery, rape, forcible sodomy, or aggravated sexual
assault, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated burglary, burglary,
aggravated kidnaping or kidnaping.
(e)
The homicide was committed for the purpose of
avoiding or preventing an arrest by a peace officer acting
under color of legal authority or for the purpose of effecting
an escape from lawful custody.
(f)
The homic~de was committed for pecuniarj' or other
personal gain.
(g)
After having previously been convic:ed o~ ~irst
or second degree murder.
(h)
The hom1cide was committed ~or the 9urpase of
preventing a witness from t~st1f~·1~~, or 3 ?ersor1 ~rom proVldlno e\·idence,
r J persor-: ~::-.:rn ~:1r-:. ~·== ~
proceedinas or of 121al ~~,;~st~~~t~on

(2)

'lurder

n the

f~rst

1': i_:;,:;

decree 1s c c'l:

1:: sn·:· leca.l

~"3~

::ce:;scc.
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that a defendant intentionally or knowingly caused the death
of another under one of the seven specified circumstances.
Since these circumstances are elements of the crime of murder
in the first degree, due process requires that the State has
to prove the existence of at least one of these circumstances
beyond a reasonable doubt.

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).

These circumstances distinguish murder in the first from
murder in the second degree.

State v. Pierre, supra.~/

2/
76-5-203. Murder in the second degree.--(1) Criminal
homicide constitutes murder in the second degree if the
actor:
(a)
Intentionally or knowingly causes the death of
another; or
(b)
Intending to cause serious bodily injury to another,
he commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes
the death of another; or
(c)
Acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved
indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct
which creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby
causes the death of another; or
(d)
While in the commission, attempted commission, or
immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission
of aggravated robbery, robbery, rape, forcible sodomy, or
aggravated sexual assault, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated
burglary, burglary, aggravated kidnaping or kidnaping, causes
the death of another person other than a party.
(2)
Murder in the second degree is a felony of the
first degree.
This difference was described in State v. Pierre, supra.
The critical difference between murder in the
first and second degrees is that the former requires
the actor to cause intentionally and knowingly the
death of another under aggravated circumstances while
the latter requires an intentional and knowing death
or the commission of listed acts of aggravation which
~Ause death or recklessness with a depraved indifference
to human life-which eventuates in death.
First degree
~urder 1n br1ef requires a conJoining of "intentional
~rd ~~=~tna'' ~lth enumerated acts but second degree
muc8ec ·s srec1f1ed in the dislunctive, thereby not
:~.:.Lrl~.: '::C'l~s un1on.
572 P.2d at 1354.
[emphasis by
"'teeby the
:.:·ur•j
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These very same circumstances are the aggravating
circumstances that the jury considers in its determination
to impose the death penalty, Utah Code Ann. §76-3-207 (1973
as amended).~/

Although that statute does not provide for

II

76-3-207. Capital felony--Hearing on sentence.--(!)
When a defendant has been found guilty of a capital felony,
there shall be further proceedings before the court or jury
on the issue of penalty. The proceedings shall be conducted
before the court or jury which found the defendant guilty,
provided the defendant may waive hearing before the jury,
in which event the hearing shall be before the court.
In
these proceedings, evidence may be presented as to any matter
the court deems relevant to sentence, including but not
limited to the nature and circumstances of the crime, the
defendant's character, background, history, mental and
physical condition, and any other facts in aggravation or
mitigation of the penalty. Any evidence the court deems
to have probative force may be received regardless of its
admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence. The
state's attorney and the defendant shall be permitted to
present argument for or against sentence of death.
Aggravating
circumstances shall include those as outlined in 76-5-202.
Mitigation circumstances shall include the following:
(a)
The defendant has no significant history of prior
criminal activity;
(b)
The murder was committed while the defendant was
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance;
(c)
The defendant acted under extreme duress or under
the substantial domination of another person;
(d)
At the time of the murder, the capacity of the
defendant to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirement
of law was substantially impaired as a result of mental
disease, intoxication, or influence of drugs;
(e)
The youth of the defendant at the time of the
crime;
(f)
The defendant was an accomplice in the murder
committed by another person and his participation was
relatively minor;
(g)
Any other fact in rnit1~ation of the penalty.
(2)
The court Dr Jur::·, 3S t'1e case rnay ce, shall retire
to cons1der the penalt~.
In 3ll ~rDceedi~as before a ~ury,
under this section,

ment to be 1mposed

.:;_t shall r--e ~nstru,_:~ed 3S ':':· the punlsha unan~~ous ~erd~~t ~~r 10ath and

~~en
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any standard of proof, this court held that the State had
the burden of proving that a defendant's acts warrant the
death penalty.

The standard given was that the aggravating

circumstances must outweigh the mitigating circumstances.
State v. Pierre, supra.

The reasons that the court qave

for requiring this standard rather than the reasonable doubt
standard in sentencing were that it would make it nearly
impossible in certain situations for the prosecutor to meet
the reasonable doubt burden, and secondly, in the guilt
phase at least one of the aggravating circumstances had been
proven to exist beyond a reasonable doubt.
The effect of this low burden of proof and the
Utah statutory scheme is threefold.

First of all, in the

3/ (continued)
that to be imposed if a unanimous verdict for death is not
found.
If the jury reports unanimous agreement to impose
the sentence of death, the court shall discharge the jury
and shall impose the sentence of death.
If the jury is
unable to reach a unanimous verdict imposing the sentence
of death, the court shall discharge the jury and impose the
sentence of life imprisonment.
(3)
Upon any appeal by the defendant where the sentence
is of death, the supreme court, if it finds prejudicial error
in the sentencing proceeding only, may set aside the sentence
of death and remand the case to the trial court, in which
event the trial court shall impose the sentence of life
1mprisonment.
(4)
I~ the event the death penalty in a capital felony
is held to be unconstitutional by the Utah supreme court or
~he United States supreme court, the court having jurisdiction
~vcr a person previously sentenced to death for a capital
f~lonv sholl cause such oerson to be brouqht before the
ccur~. 3nd ~he court sha~l sentence the p~rson to life imprisonmu~t. and 3r
o~rson who is thereafter convicted of a capital
~~lo~· sh3ll·t~ sente~ced to life imprisonment.
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sentencing phase of the trial, the burden of proving that
the death penalty must not be imposed is placed on the
defendant.

Secondly, the burden of proof is so low that it

does not prevent mistakes in the application of the death
penalty, and it gives no guidance to the discretion of the
sentencing authority in its decision to impose the death
penalty or sentence the defendant to life imprisonment.
Finally, in certain situations, such as the case at hand,
the low burden of proof makes the imposition of the death
penalty mandatory after a finding of guilt for murder in
the first degree.

A.
The Burden of Proving Facts Which
Distinguish Those Who May L1ve From Those
Who Must Die is Impermissibly Shifted to
the Convicted Defendant Under Utah Capital
Sentencing Procedures.
In State v. Pierre, supra, this court held that the
burden of proving that a defendant convicted of a capital
offense is to be sentenced to death is on the State.

That

burden is met if the evidence that the state presents outweighs the evidence presented by the defendant.

The Utah

statutory scheme requires that one of the aggravating circumstances must be proved to exist beyond a reasonable doubt
before the defendant can be convicted of the capital felony
of murder in the flrst degree

Consequently, the State has

proven the

ne2essar~·

existe~ce

o~

all the

a~~~3\"3tl~g

c1r-
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sentencing phase.

It must be assumed that the proof of

these circumstances are given great weight by the jury because
if the jury does not find that one of these circumstances
exists the defendant is guilty of the lesser included offense
of murder in the second degree which is not a capital felony.
In other words, the sentencing authority is aware that the
legislature has given great weight to the proof of the
existence of these circumstances because once proved to be
a part of the offense there must be a hearing to determine
if the defendant is to be sentenced to death rather than a
sentence of life imprisonment.
The practical effect is that the state has proved
the existence of a fact of great weight, and to prevent an
execution, convicted defendants must present enough evidence
to meet or outweigh the gravity that has been attached to the
proof of one of the aggravating circumstances--he must prove
the existence of a mitigating circumstance beyond a reasonable
doubt.
The miticating circumstances described in Utah
Code Ann. §76-3-207 (1973)i_/ are all of a factual nature
(crlminal history, diminished capacity, duress, insanity,
~·outh,
t~ca

'lnd ?icarious liability).

These are all the same

of f3ctors that are required to be proved or disproved

:c•_·-

-,t,ote 3, supra.
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beyond a reasonable doubt in determining guilt or innocence
in our system of justice, Mullaney v. Wilber, 421

(1975).

u.s.

684

This is because they involve the same processes

and risks of error as are involved in any other factual
determination in our criminal justice system.

The only

functional distinction between facts to be proven at trial
and the facts at issue in sentencing is that where at least
one aggravating circumstance has been proven to exist in
a capital case, the determination of the existence of a mitigating circumstance means the difference between a mandatory
death penalty and a chance for life.
The primary reason for requiring the high standard
of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" in criminal cases is
because when the defendant has at stake interests of transcending value--his liberty or his life--there is a great
need to reduce the chance of factual error and this is done
by requiring the State to meet a very high standard of proof.
In re Winship, supra.

This standard has not been limited

solely to those facts which define the elements of a crime,
but it is to be applied to those distinctions which reflect
the degree of culpability in a criminal act.
Wilber, supra.

Mullaney v.

The interest at stake here is of the most

transcending value known to an:,· person-- his very existence.
The Un1ted States

Su~re~e

Court

ha~

recoanized
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of death and one of life imprisonment and that "there is a
corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in
a specific case."

u.s.

Woodson v. North Carolina, supra, 428

at 305 (plurality opinion).

Since the Utah capital

punishment procedures effectively shift the burden of proof
to the defendant, the protection of the reliability of
factual determinations has been disguarded, and the need
for reliability in the imposition of the death penalty
has likewise been disguarded.
Not only do the Utah statutes impermissively shift
the burden of proof to the defendant, but the burden placed
on the defendant is greater than that placed on the state in
the guilt phase of the trial.

As has previously been

described, the same circumstances to be shown to exist to
prove murder in the first degree are to be used to prove
that the death penalty is to be imposed.

Since the standard

of proof of the aggravating circumstance required in the guilt
phase of a capital trial is proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
there will be nothing that the state has to present in the
sentencing phase of a trial.

This is because the state's

evidence 1n sentencing need merely outweigh the defendant's
ev1dence.

In other words, the defendant must present evidence

sufficient to prevent the state's evidence from outweighing
h1s c•"ldercc.
·~

•·

b~

Loqic dictates the conclusion that if this

jone, the defendant must prove the existence of
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mitigating circumstances either to be of the same or greater
weight than the aggravating circumstances that have already
been proved.

This means that the standard to be met in proving

mitigating circumstances will be either beyond a reasonable
doubt, or something greater than beyond a reasonable doubt.
Such a shift in the burden of proof clearly violates the
Supreme court's holdings in In re Winship, supra, and in
Mullaney v. Wilber, supra, and in Patterson v. New York,
432

u.s.

197 (1977).

B.
The Low Standard of Proof Required in
Utah Capital Sentencing Procedures Impermissibly Allows the Sentencing Authority
to Exercise Unguided Discretion ~n Sentencing
a Convicted Defendant to Death.
The standard of proof in a capital sentencing phase
in Utah is so low that it gives a judge or jury virtually
unlimited discretion in imposing the death penalty, thus
violating the requirements of the Eighth Amendment.

The

standard of proof of facts in a lawsuit will influence the
frequency of error in the determination of those facts.
With a higher standard there is a lower possibility of error,
Speiser v. Randall, 359 U.S.

513

(1958).

The interests

requiring the need for the high standard of proof in criminal
cases (and the resulting lower possibility of error) were
descr1bed in In re Winship,

supra.

of the accused 1n his liberty cr

~s

The first is the interest
in

t~e

c~se

at hand,
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second interest is to prevent the dilution of the moral force
of the criminal law by applying a standard of proof that leaves
citizens in doubt whether innocent people are being condemned
or executed.

The final interest is that of a free society in

allowing people to go about their ordinary affairs with
confidence that the government is not going to adjudge them
guilty of criminal offenses without utmost certainty.
With a low standard of proof, such as the "weight
of the evidence" standard, there is a very low degree of
subjective certainty that the fact finder is required to
have.

With a lower degree of subjective certainty, as had

been described previously, there is a higher probability of
factual error, In re Winship, supra.

This is because there

simply is not enough certainty required of the jury in the
standard to guide the jury's discretion in making factual
determinations.

With a low standard of proof, whim, caprice,

discriminatory attitudes and other arbitrary factors are
allowed to enter into the fact finder's decisions resulting
in the factual errors described in In re Winship, supra.
In the sentencing phase of a capital trial, the
sentencing authority's discretion must be directed so that
its attention is focused on the particular circumstances
cf the
~h~

s

~r1~e

and on the individual character of the defendant.

~~~t~~c1~a
33

authority's discretion must also be guided

t , el1minate arbitrariness and capriciousness in its
:~cr~la,

supra,

Prof~~tt

v. Florida, supra,
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Jurek v. Texas, supra, Woodson v. North Carolina, supra,
Stanislaus Roberts v. Louisiana, spura, Harry Roberts v.
Louisiana, supra.
As has been shown, in Utah the standard of proof
to determine whether or not to impose the death penalty is
"the weight of the evidence."

This standard was applied to

the appellant in his criminal trial.

This standard is too

low to give the guidance to the sentencing authority's
discretion, required by the Eighth Amendment, in determining
whether or not the death penalty is to be imposed.
this low

sta~dard

Because

allows incredibly wide discretion on the

part of the sentencing authority, arbitrariness and capriciousness will undoubtedly play a part in the imposition of
the death penalty in any given case.

Such unguided discretion

was the principal cause of those problems that led to the
United State Supreme Court's holdings in Furman v. Georgia,
supra.

c.
The Utah Capital Sentencing Procedures
Violate the Cruel and Unusual Punlshment
Clause of the E1ghth Amendment Because
Under Certa1n Clrcumstances the Impos1tion
of the Death Penaltv W1ll be Mandatorv
Upon a F1nd1ng of G~llt.
·
The Utah capital punishment statutes allow for
the mandatory impos1t10n of the death penalty in violation
of the Eighth Amendment.

As had

bee~

descr1bed above, the
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degree from murder in the second degree are the same circumstances required to be proved to impose the death penalty.
Due process requires that the existence of such circumstances
to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, In re Winship, supra.
This means that the State need not prove anything in the
sentencing phase of the trial.

If the defendant has little

or no evidence to present, the imposition of the death
sentence will be mandatory because the State need only prove
that the death penalty is to be imposed by the weight of
the evidence.

The judge or jury will be given no leeway to

further consider either the particular circumstances of
the crime or the character of the individual defendant as
required by Gregg v. Georgia, supra, and its companion cases.
Such a mandatory imposition of the death penalty upon a
finding of guilt of a crime is prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment.

Woodson v. North Carolina, supra, Stanislaus

Roberts v. Louisiana, supra, Harry Roberts v. Louisiana,
supra.
The fact that these circumstances provided a very
narrow definition of the kind of offense that subjects a
defendant to the death penalty is constitutionally immaterial.
That was the exact situation which the Supreme Court held
to violate the Eighth Amendment in Stanislaus Roberts v.
LGU~s1ana,

~·lh

supra.

This situation is unique to Utah because

1s the only state where the standard of proof in the
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5/
capital sentencing phase is so low.-

Furthermore, Utah is

the only jurisdiction where the requirements to prove the
substantive elements of the capital offense are the same
as the aggravating circumstances needed to be proven to
sentence an offender to death.
This is what happened in the case at hand.

The

State needed to put on only minimal evidence in sentencing
because the aggravating circumstance or circumstances had
been proved to exist beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant

had nothing of an exceptional nature that he could show in
his background.

He was in the Air Force and until this

incident he had led a fairly unnoticed life.

With the low

standard of proof, the imposition of the death penalty was
mandatory upon a finding of guilt.
5/
The vast majority of jurisdictions require proof of the
aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt:
Cal. Penal Code §190.3 (Supp. 1977); 11 Del. Code Ann.
§4209 (Cum. Supp. 1975); Ga. Code Ann. §26-3102 (1976 Supp.);
Idaho Code §19-2515 (Cum. Supp. 1975); Ill, Rev. State c 38
§9-1 (1973); 16 Ky. Rev. Stat. §532.025 (Supp. 1977); Vernon's
Mo. Stat. Ann. §565.012 (Supp. 1977); 21 Okla. Stat. Ann.
§701.10 (Supp. 1976); Tenn. Code Ann. §39-2404 (Supp. 1977);
Vernon's Tex. Code Crim. Proc., Art. 37.071 (Supp. 1975-1976);
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §6-54.2 (L977 Wyo. Sess.)
The aggravating circumstance must be proved to exist
beyond a reasonable doubt under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2929.03
(Page Spec. Supp. 1973).
Statutes with some other standard of proof or an unspecified standard of proof include:
Ala. Code §13-11-2
(1975 Supp.) (unspecified standard); Ariz. Rev. Stat Ann.
§13-452 (Supp. 1973) (unspecified standard); Gen. Stat.
Conn. §53a -56a (Supp. 1977) (unspecified standard); Mont.
Rev. Codes Ann. §94-5-105 (Spec. Crim. Code Supp. 1973)
(unspecified); Neb. Rev. Stat. §29-2522 (Cum. Supp. 1974)
(Sufficient aggravat1nc c1rcumstances to JUStlfv death
pena1t:r·); Nev. Rev. Stat. §::C00.030 (l.973) (uns;::ecl:'led standard.
In Flor1da the facts suocest1nq a sentence of death
should be so c:e3r a~d cc~vl;~~~~ ~;2- ·---~~~31:·.· ~= re23~nable
person could d1::er,

Ted~e~ ·:. __ _i':_~-~-'

3=2 So.

::~Or),~

~1?...,':\.
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POINT III
IT IS BOTH UNCONSCIONABLE AND A DENIAL
OF DUE PROCESS TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY
WHEN THERE ARE UNRESOLVED LEGAL AND FACTUAL
ISSUES PENDING IN A CASE. THIS IS BECAUSE
OF TP.E FINALITY AND QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN THE SENTENCE OF DEATH MID A SENTENCE
OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT.
Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution of Utah
provides, "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless, in the case of rebellion or
invasion, the public safety requires it."

Although this

right may not be suspended, this court has placed severe
limitations on its application.

In Bryant v. Turner, 19

Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121 (1967), the court stated:
We do not mean to say that the time
honored writ of habeas corpus does not have
a very important and useful purpose in our
law. But that purpose is not to review a
final judgment arrived at through regular
proceedings and due process of law by a court
having jurisdiction. The writ is, as our
rules describe it, an extraordinary writ,
to be used to protect one who is restrained
of his liberty where the requirements of the
law have been so ignored or distorted that
the party is substantially and effectively
denied what is included in the term due
process of law, or where some other such
circumstance exists that it would be wholly
unconscionable not to re-examine the conviction."
[footnotes omitted] 431 P.2d 121,
122-123.
This standard has been repeatedly upheld, the most
:~e>::(C~t:

,-'ise

l:l

•..:h1ch 1t was is
~ith

\_'lebster~v.

Jones, 587 P.2d

respect to the case at hand the
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However, all the claims which the appellant raised involved
violation of his Sixth and Eighth Amendment rights of the
United States Constitution.

The rights guaranteed in both

of these amendments have been applied to the states by means
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment.~

Since all of these claims involve denials of due process the
only thing that could prohibit their consideration by means
of habeas corpus is the doctrine of collateral estoppel,
which was discussed above.
The state may emphasize the fact that such claims
could have been raised on direct appeal and argue that to
allow such cla1ms to be raised by means of writ of habeas
corpus a defendant may save issues by not raising them on
direct appeal and thus extend the already lengthy time of
litigation.

Such an argument is without merit.

On an appeal

from a criminal conviction, a defendant is usually asking
for a new trial or reduction of his sentence.

By not raising

an issue on direct appeal so that it may be raised in habeas
corpus the defendant may be precluding himself from receiving
immediate relief.

That means that the litigation will be

continued at a great cost, both economic and emotional, to

6/
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel was held to be
applicable to the states in Gideon v. \·lainwriqht, 372 U.S.
335 (1963); in Sheppard v. '!axweir;---·:Js:f-~333 (1966),
the Sixth .~endment guarantee of a fair trial was held
applic3.ble to the states; 3:-:d ?obinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660 (19621, 3pp:!.ied ::he ~rotect!"ns o:' the cruel and
unusual punishment 2l::1.use of

t~~e

::~ -~:-.·->.

_.::...r.er.c3:ne:Jt..

1:'J

tb.e

states.
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,
himself.

It further means that he may have to suffer the

impact of a criminal sentence before he is able to receive
the relief which he is entitled to.
The case law, as cited above, also allows habeas
corpus review if it would be unconscionable not to re-examine
the conviction.

Anytime that a person's life is at stake

due to a sentence of death, it would be unconscionable for
a court not to examine viable and legitimate legal issues
which may preclude the imposition of that sentence.

The

central theme of Gregg V. Georgia, supra, and its companion
cases is that there is a gualitative difference between the
death penalty and any other criminal sentence and the courts
have a duty to insure reliability before such a sentence
may be imposed.

This point was most eloquently stated by

Mr. Justice Stewart in the plurality opinion in Woodson v.
North Carolina, supra, where he stated:
This conclusion rests squarely on the
predicate that the penalty of death is
qualitatively different from a sentence of
imprisonment, however long.
Death, in its
finality, differs more from life imprisonment
than a hundred-year prison term differs from
one of only a year or two.
Because of the
qualitative difference, there is a corresponding
difference in the need for reliability in the
determination that death is the appropriate
punlshment in a specific case.
[footnote
omitted]
4 2 8 U.S. 2 8 0, 3 0 5.
~r.

Justice Stevens stressed the importance of this

''3r:-:l:-.er \'. Florida, supra,
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Five members of the Court have now
expressly recognized that death is a different
kind of punishment from any other which may
be imposed in this country. Gregg v. Georgia,
428 u.s. 153, 181-188, (opinion of Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); see id., at 231-241
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. at 286-291, (Brennan, J., concurr~ng),
306-310, (Stewart J.,
concurring), 306-310,
(Stewart, J., concurring), 306-310; see id.,
at 314-371, (Marshall, J., concurring). From
the point of view of the defendant, it is
different in both its severity and its finality.
From the point of view of society, the action
of the sovereign in taking the life of one of
its citizens also differs dramatically from
any other leg~timate state action.
It is of
vital importance to the defendant and to the
community that any decision to impose the
death sentence be, and appear to be, based
on reason rather than caprice or emotion.
430 c.:.s. 349, 357-358.
And that point was most recently reiterated in
Lockett v. Ohio, supra, when Chief Justice Burger noted
that the penalty of death is qualitatively different from
any other sentence.

Writing for the court he stated:

We are satisifed that this qualitative
difference between death and other penalties
calls for a greater degree of reliability when
the death sentence is imposed, 571 L.Ed. 2d
973, 989.
Because of this irreversibility it is unconscionable
for a court to allow a man to be sentenced to death when there
are legal or factual issues which after consideration on the
merits would entitle him, as a habeas

cor~us

petitioner,

to a new trial or to a reduct1on in the sentence of death
to one of l1fe
is precL.1ded

~,

1m~r1sonment.

The

tvp1c~l

1nnate who either
~3L~t'.J3l

issues
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as a probationary sentence rather than incarceration,
additional privileges while incarcerated, or an early
release from incarceration by means of parole.

None of

these forms of relief, however, are available to a person
sentenced to die.

Once that sentence is carried out all

other questions of sentencing alternatives or a new trial
become moot.
Likewise, the imposition of the death penalty
with these issues still unresolved would be a denial of
due process of law.

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United

States Constitution provides, " ... nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty or property without due process
of law."

Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah

provides the same guarantee.

In the case of In re Winship,

397 U.S. 358 (1970), the Supreme Court held that due process
required the reasonable doubt standard to be applied in
criminal cases.

The court held that the standard protects

an interest of transcending value--a person's liberty--and
to lose this liberty on the basis of facts that amount to a
preponderance of the evidence would be fundamentally unfair.
A person's life is of even more transcending value than his
llberty, and the Due Process Clause expressly provides that
a person

s~~ll

~f

To

law.

~c·::·"~

t~ke
~·t

en:! •
~.

not be deprived of his life without due process

'

:

a person's life when there are unresolved

:ol .:ruestions that may preclude such a penalty
,

~l

.-,f :undamenta.l fairness than depriving
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him of his liberty on facts which fail to establish his
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Furthermore, in Gardner

v. Florida, supra, the court relied on the qualitative
difference between the sentence of death and one of imprisonment to reach the conclusion that all the requirements of due
process be met before a person is sentenced to death.

On

the basis of this qualitative difference, as discussed above
with respect to the unconscionability of imposing the death
penalty with legal issues available, due process mandates
that a convicted defendant in a capital case be allowed to
fully and fairly litigate all legal issues before the State
can deprive nim of his life.

As discussed above, there

are such issues in the appellant's case.

It will be a

denial of due process to impose the death penalty without
resolving these issues.
Since the appellant in this case was sentenced to
death, habeas corpus is the final form of relief in the
state courts that is available to him, this court must remand
the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing
and a hearing on the merits of the issues raised in appellant's
petition for writ of habeas corpus.
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POINT IV
THE UTAH COURTS IMPROPERLY APPLY RES
JUDICATA RATHER THAN COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL TO
WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS, THUS PRECLUDING
PETITIONERS FROM RAISING ISSUES THAT COULD
HAVE BEEN RAISED ON DIRECT APPEALi FURTHERMORE, THE DISTRICT COURT HAD NO EVIDENCE
BEFORE IT TO DECIDE IF EITHER RES JUDICATA
OR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL WERE APPLICABLE IN
THIS CASE.
In Utah the Writ of Habeas Corpus is available as
a constitutional right.

Article I, Section 5 of the Con-

stitution of Utah provides, "The privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless, in case of
rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it."

In

the case of Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 284, 431 P.2d 121
(1967), this court discussed the purposes of the writ of
habeas corpus, stating:
We do not mean to say that the time
honored writ of habeas corpus does not have
a very important and useful purpose in our
law. But that purpose is not to review a
final judgment arrived at through regular
proceedings and due process of law by a
court having jurisdiction. The writ, is,
as our rules describe it, an extraordinary
writ, to be used to protect one who is
restrained of his liberty where there exists
no jurisdiction or authority. or where the
requirements of the law have been so ignored
or distorted that the party is substantially
and effectively denied what is included in
the term due process of law, or where some
other such circumstance exists that it would
be wholly unconscionable not to re-examine
the conviction.
[footnotes omitted) 431 P.2d
at 122-123.
The questions which appellant raised in his petition
::r ~r 1 t
:•.cdsr:il

:f

Habeas corpus all involve substantial state and

c:nst 1 t:u+:icnal auo>stions.

The federal questions
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involve the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.

The state questions involve

Article I, Sections 7, 9, 10, and 12 of the Constitution of
Utah.

Claims of violations of such constitutional rights

may properly be raised on habeas corpus so that the courts
may determine if the petitioner's right to due process has
been substantially and effectively denied as required by
Bryant v. Turner, supra.

However, this is not to say that

a petitioner in habeas corpus may continue to raise the same
issues as he raised on direct appeal.

This is because the

determination of such issues will have barred further consideration at a later date under the doctrines of res judicata
or collateral estoppel.

In Richardson v. Hodson, 26 Utah

2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044 (1971), this court distinguished between
res judicata and collateral estoppel.

The court stated:

Strictly speaking, the term "res
judicata" applies to a judgment between
the same parties who in a prior action
litigated the identical questions which
are present in the later case. Not only are
the parties bound by the ruling on matters
actually litigated, but they are also prevented from raising issues which should
have been raised in the former action.
The rule of law is wise in that it gives
finality to judgments and also conserves
the time of courts, in that courts should
not be required to relitigate matters which
have once been fully and finally determined.
485 P.2d 1044, 1046.
In that case the court found that because different parties
were involved in

t~e

second

~roc~~d1na

r~s

iudicata, as

defined, could not te appl1ed.
to state:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-30-

A form of res judicata applies to
situations like this wherein issues which
are actually decided against a party in a
prior action may be relied upon by an
opponent in a later case as having been
judicially established. This doctrine,
known as collateral estoppel, differs
from res judicata not only in the fact
that all parties need not be the same in
the two actions, but also in the fact that
the estoppel applies only to issues actually
litigated and not to those which could have
been determined.
485 P.2d at 1046.
Without actually calling it res judicata this court has
consistently applied this principle in habeas corpus as
reflected in the case of Bennett v. Smith, 547 P.2d 696
(1976).

In that case the court stated that the petitioner

in habeas corpus "should not be permitted at a later time
to use habeas corpus to again attack his conviction on
matters which were either dealt with or could have been
dealt with at the time for appeal."

547 P.2d 696, 697.

However, res judicata cannot properly be applied to issues
that could have been raised in a criminal appeal that are
subsequently raised on a habeas corpus because the parties
in a habeas corpus proceeding are different than in a criminal
proceeding, the burdens of proof are different and the relief
sought in the two proceedings is different.

Consequently,

collateral estoppel not res judicata must apply in habeas
cor~us

proceedings.

Thus the petitioner in habeas corpus

is orecluded from raising only those issues which were
3Ct~3ll:

lLtiaated in the prior proceeding.
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This position is reinforced by Rule 65B(i) (2)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The portion of that

rule which deals with prior adjudication of issues rasied
in habeas corpus provides:
The complaint shall further state
that the legality or constitutionality
of his commitment or confinement has not
already been adjudged in a prior habeas
corpus or other similar proceeding; and
if the complainant shall have instituted
prior similar proceedings in any court,
state or federal, within the State of
Utah, he shall so state in his complaint,
shall attach a copy of any pleading filed
in such court by him to his complaint, and
shall set forth the reasons for the denial
of rel1ef in such other court.
In such
case, if it is apparent to the court in
which the proceeding under this Rule is
instituted that the legality or constitutionality of his confinement has alrea1y
been adjudged in such prior proceedings,
the court shall forthwith dismiss such
complaint, giving written notice thereof
by mail to the complainant, and no further
proceedings shall be had on such complaint.
As can be seen, the rule does not preclude a petitioner
from raising issues that under some stretch of the imagination
could have been raised in a prior proceeding.

But rather,

the rule precludes a habeas corpus petitioner only from
raising issues that have actually been litigated in a prior
proceeding.

In fact, the effect of not allowing a habeas

corp•Js petitioner from raising issues that could have been
rasied on direct appeal 1s to completely read Rule 65B(i)
out of the Utah Rules of C1vil Procedure

denial of

:1

substar.tlcl

~cro;c:r·_:r:c·:_ ~

That rule allows

;:,chc.

Such challenqes
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are always available on direct appeal from the proceedings
which resulted in his commitment.
The present state of the Utah law with respect to
the Writ of Habeas Corpus precludes a potential petitioner
from raising two types of issues.

The first type involve

obscure constitutional challenges which become more apparent
after changes in the law by means of new cases.

The nature

of the issues raised is discussed in detail in Point III,
infra.

The second type of issue involves those for which

the factual basis is lacking at the time of trial or appeal,
but with the passage of time the factual basis develops.
This type question was raised by appellant in his claim
that the pattern and practice of prosecution and administration
of capital cases is arbitrary and capricious

(R.6-9).

In addition to those elements of collateral estoppel
which have been described, before a trial court can determine
whether or not either of those doctrines apply the record
of the prior proceeding must be before the trial court.

In

Parrish v. Layton City corporation, 542 P.2d 1086 (1975),
this court reversed a trial court's grant of a motion for
summary judgment based on a claim of res judicata because
the trial court did not have the record of the prior proceedings
before it.

In the case at hand the attorney general claimed

that petltioner had not raised any issues of fact or law
wh1ch were raised or could have been raised on direct appeal
?

~ ~ J.

I

~he

tr~al

court in reaching its decision agreed
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with that contention (R.l50).

The record in the previous

case was never introduced into evidence by means of either
Rule 68(1) and (3) of the Utah Rules of Evidence or by Rule
44(a) and (d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
the trial court has no

basi~

Obviously

on which to rule that no new

issues of fact or law had been raised.
The case must be remanded to the trial court for
further and proper consideration of the issue of collateral
estoppel.
before

i~

This is because the trial court had no facts
~~

which it could base its decision.

Furthermore,

the Utah case law with respect to the Writ of Habeas Corpus
improperly applies the standard of res judicata rather than
collateral estoppel in determining which issues may be raised
on habeas corpus.

In remanding the case to the district

court this court must order the district court to allow
the appellant to raise issues that could have been raised
on direct appeal from his conviction.

POINT V
THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED
RESPO:-:JUENT 'S MOTION TO DIS~1ISS BECAUSE IT
DOES NOT APPEAR TO A CERTAINTY THAT THERE
IS :-:10 ST.:\TE OF F.:..CTS WHICH COCLD BE PROVED
TO SUPPORT THE APPELL.:.~;T' S CL.;I,I'l FOR
RELIEF.

_"'}'C"r:::ur:ds.

T'"lese
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grounds were that the issues raised by appellant were or
could have been raised on appeal, that the law allows the
prosecution discretion in charging a capital felony and
finally that all issues raised in the petition had previously
been addressed and disposed of in this court's ruling in
State v. Pierre, supra, and in the United States Supreme
Court's denial of appellant's Writ of Certiorari.

Although

not specifically stated, this motion must have been made
pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

This is because the rules of civil procedure are

generally applicable to habeas corpus proceedings, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure

Bl(a)~/

and Rule 12(b) (6) is the

only rule which is applicable to respondent's motion.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6)!/ allows
a court to dismiss an action upon defendant's motion if the

II

Special Statutory Proceedings. These Rules shall apply
to all special statutory proceedings, except insofar as such
Rules are by their nature clearly inapplicable. Where a
statute provides for procedure by reference to any part of
the former Code of Civil Procedure, such procedure shall be
in accordance with these Rules.

8;
How Presented.
Every defense, in law or fact, to claim
for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the
resoonsive pleadinq thereto if one is required except that
the ~ollaw1ng defenses may at the option of the pleader be
:r:.vico b·· rnot1on:
(l) lack of 'iurisdiction over the subject
'T'c~t:':.er, (2l lack of lUrlsdiction over the person, (3) improper
•··~:>:c. '~I 1nsuffici~ncv of process, (5) insufficiency of
s.~r"•,_·-~
:·rC'"c>ss, (fi)- failure to state a claim upon which
1
•• •
:3'' c" "rv:ted, (7) failure to join an indispensable
~oc
~ ~3Klna 3ny of these defenses shall be made
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plaintiff's pleadings fail to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.

Because of the severity of such an action by

a trial court, this court has strictly construed the requirements and limitations of a dismissal pursuant to Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure 12(b).
commission v. Athas, 121

In the case of Liquor Control

u.

457 243 P.2d 441 (1952), this

court reversed a trial court's finding that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action upon which relief may be
granted.

In doing so the court stated:
A motion to dismiss should not be
granted unless it appears to a certainty
that plaintiff would be entitled to no
relief under any state of facts which could
be proved in support of its claim.
[citation
omitted]
243 P.2d 441, 443

This same principle was stated with approval in Christensen
v. Lelis Automotive Transmission Service, Inc., 24 Ut. 2d
165, 467 P.2d 605, 607 (1970) .

.Y

(continued)

before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No
defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or
more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading
or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such
motion or objection.
If a pleading sets forth a claim for
relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve
a responsive pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense
in law or fact to that claim for relief.
If, on a motion
asserting the defense numbered {6) to dismiss for failure of
the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and
not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as
one for summary iudgment and disposed of ~s provided in Rule
56, and all parties shall be givPn r~asonable opportunity to
present all materi'll made pert1nenc: to such a mot1on by Rule "'
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Under this test, the appellant in the case at ban4
did allege sufficient grounds for the relief requested.

~

appellant requested either to be discharged from his confinement because he was convicted at a trial during which
his rights under the United States Constitution and the
Constitution of Utah were violated or to be relieved from
an unconstitutional sentence of death.

Such grounds were

alleged in points 11 and 12 of appellant's petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus (R.3-9).

It is a simple matter to

contemplate any number of states of facts which could be
proved in support of any or all of these claims.

On this

basis, the respondent's motion to dismiss should have been
denied by the district court, a stay of execution granted
and the case set for an evidentiary hearing.

This court

must reverse the district court's ruling and remand the
case for such a hearing.
POINT VI
BY RULING THAT THE APPELLANT HAD RAISED
NO ISSUES OF FACT WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN
RAISED ON DIRECT APPEAL, THE DISTRICT COURT
IMPROPERLY CONVERTED THE RESPONDENT'S MOTION
TO DISMISS INTO A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED
FURTHER ERROR BY NOT ALLOWING THE APPELLANT
TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT CONTROVERTING FACTS.
An important aspect of a motion pursuant to Rule

12 r.2) 16)
3

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is that such

mot1on cannot, on the court's own initiative, be converted
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into a motion for summary judgment (pursuant to Rule 56 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure).

In Hill v. Grand Central,

Inc., 25 Ut. 2d 121, 477 P.2d 150 (1970), this court reversed
a district court order which converted a motion to dismiss
into a summary judgment.

The motion to dismiss in that

case was made pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.

The court's order denied the defendant's

motion to dismiss and required the plaintiff to produce
evidence in support of her allegations within 30 days and
upon failure to produce such evidence a motion for summary
judgment would be granted for the defendant.

With respect

to the district court order this court stated:
True it is that when a motion to dismiss
is accompanied by affidavits it may be treated
as a motion for summary judgment, yet the court
should not on its own initiative try to convert
a motion for dismissal into one for summary
judgment.
It has no more right to ask the
plaintiff how he will establish his claim
than it has to require the defendant to state
what its defense will be.
It would have been
highly improper for the court, on the motion
to dismiss, to have given the defendant 30
days to present proof as to the truth of the
alleged statement or as to the lack of malice.
477 P.2d 150, 151.
It was also emphasized that one of the parties must
move for summary judgment, not the court on its own initiative.
The principle that a trial court on its own initiative cannot
convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment
was also held to be applicable in Harvey v. Sanders, 534 P.2d
905 (Utah, 1975).

In that case. r.cv.e\·er, the court held
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a
~~

that even if the motion for summary judgment wae

~.

issues of fact were still in dispute so that the grantlag
of the motion for summary judgment was also improper.
The most recent case in this jurisdiction on tbie
principle is Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Utah Farm PrOduction,
587 P.2d 151 {Utah, 1978).

In that case the plaintiff

cla~

that defendant owed it money for an overpayment on a secured
note.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss which was

accompanied by affidavits that tended to establish either
an accurate payoff or accord and satisfaction.

Although

the motion was not denominated as being made pursuant to
Rule 12{b) {6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial
court issued a memorandum decision that had the effect of
treating defendant's motion to dismiss as one for summary
judgment in dismissing the action.

The court reversed the

judgment of the district court because the plaintiff was
given neither notice nor opportunity to present additional
materials.

In a very similar case, Strand v. Associated

Students of the University of Utah, 561 P.2d 191 {Utah, 1977),
not cited in Bekins Bar v Ranch v. Utah Farm Production,
supra, this court held that the refusal to allow a plaintiff
the opportunity to make reasonable discovery after a filing
of

3

motion to dismiss accompanied by an affidavit is improper.

With respect of that holding, the court stated,
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It is error to consider a motion to
dismiss as a motion for summary judgment,
without giving the adverse party an
opportunity to present pertinent material,
the action of the trial court in denying
the plaintiff the reasonable opportunity
to present controverting material violated
the mandate of the rule.
[footnote omitted]
561 P.2d 191, 193.
The case was remanded to the district court to give
the plaintiff the reasonable opportunity to obtain and present
appropriate material.

This was done because the court felt

that the district court should have either ordered a continuance to permit discovery or denied the motion for summary
judgment without prejudice to its renewal after adequate
time had elapsed for the plaintiff to obtain the desired
information.
The effect of the ruling of the district court
in the case at bar was to convert the respondent's motion
to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.

The second

paragraph of the district court's order which gives its
reasons for granting respondent's motion states:
It is the opinion of the court that the
petitioner for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed
herein raises no issue of fact or law material
to determination of the legality or constitutionality of the conviction, confinement, or
sentence of the petitioner which were not
raised or could not have been raised on appeal
to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
( R. 150).

As previouslv d1scussed, this rultng has the effect
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,
judicata.

To make this determination the trial court had

to have the record and transcript of the prior action before
it, Parrish v. Layton City Corp., supra.

Such materials

are certainly beyond the scope of the pleadings and consequently,
under Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the
appellant would be entitled to present added material to show
there were new issues of fact and that such issues could not
have been raised on appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.

In

order to uphold such a ruling this court would have to overrule that principle which has been upheld in the cases from
Hill v. Grand Central, Inc., supra, to Bekins Bar V. Ranch
v. Utah Farm Production, supra.
to the district

c~urt

This case must be remanded

to give the appellant the opportunity

to show that res judicata or collateral estoppel is not applicable.
CONCLUSION
This case must be remanded to the district court for
an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the appellant's
petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

It would be both uncon-

scionable and a denial of due process to impose the death
penalty when there are unresolved issues of fact and law in
the appellant's case.

Furthermore, the district court order

dismissing the appellant's petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
w~s

1mproper

'~P~ll3nt

~or

the following reasons:

First of all, the

should have been able to raise issues that could
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;

have been raised on direct appeal from the criminal conviction
because collateral estoppel, not res judicata, applies to
habeas corpus proceedings.

Secondly, even if the application

of res judicata was proper the district court lacked an
evidentiary basis for such a dismissal.
not appear to a certainty that

~here

Thirdly, it does

is no state of facts

which could be proved to support the appellant's claim.
Fourthly, the district court found that there were no issues
of fact without giving the appellant the opportunity to
present controverting facts.

Finally, the appellant raised

issues in his petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus that could
not have been raised on direct appeal from his criminal
conviction.
DATED this ______ day of February, 1979.
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